The Ethics of Organ Donation and Its Relationship to Brain Death by Wensley, Germaine
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 70 | Number 4 Article 5
November 2003
The Ethics of Organ Donation and Its Relationship
to Brain Death
Germaine Wensley
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Wensley, Germaine (2003) "The Ethics of Organ Donation and Its Relationship to Brain Death," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 70: No. 4,
Article 5.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol70/iss4/5
The Ethics of Organ Donation and 
Its Relationship to Brain Death 
by 
Germaine Wensley. R.N., B.S. 
The author is a member of the board of the Commission on Catholic Life 
Issues in the Los Angeles Diocese. She has served as Update Editor for 
Heartbeat and Assistant Editor for Living World. 
At this wntmg, approximately 62,000 people are waItmg for organ 
transplants, but many will die before the transplants take place. 1 Ads, 
billboards, churches, civic groups, etc., appeal to the American public to 
contemplate giving what some have termed the "gift of life." It is argued 
that because of the great shortage of organs, and the wonderful benefits for 
those who receive organs, our society must be encouraged in a variety of 
ways to donate in order to increase the number of available organs. The 
phrase "gift of life" was carefully designed as a slogan which immediately 
denotes a double message: much good derives from organ transplantation 
and you will be considered a good, generous person if you sign up to 
become a donor.2 We've all been exposed to wonderful, heart-warming 
stories of people who have been given a second chance at life with a new 
organ or organs. Yet there are some medical and ethical considerations a 
person should be aware of before signing on the dotted line. 
There are times when the morality of freely donated tissue or organs 
is not in question. Someone living can donate bone marrow, lobes of the 
liver or lung, and anyone of a paired organ such as one of two kidneys, 
without necessarily adversely affecting the life of the donor. After death, 
many tissues are also useable, such as skin, bones, corneas, veins, heart 
valves and connective tissue. This paper will not include the above 
mentioned types of transplantations. 
This paper will address the donation of singular organs vital to the 
existence of a person, conditions to be met in diagnosing the death of a 
donor based on neurological criteria, and evidence of uncertainty that 
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surrounds this diagnosis . Uncertainty about the death of the donor is at the 
very core of this ethical dilemma. 
Public awareness programs concentrate on the person waiting for the 
transplant and tend to overlook the fact that the dying donor is also a 
person whose intrinsic worth must be respected. As decisions about hislher 
life and death are being made, the morality of each action to be taken must 
be weighed. 
The primary ethical consideration, then, is assurance that death has 
truly taken place before removal of an unpaired vital organ. If the donor is 
alive when his beating heart is excised, he won ' t be able to sustain life after 
its removal. "Thou shall not kill" is one of the commandments given to us 
by God. For more than two millennia, this has also been the foundation of 
medical ethics. Intentional killing of an innocent person is of its very nature 
immoral. Nothing can tum an act that is intrinsically wrong into one that is 
good even if a good, the saving of a human life, results from the killing. 
New Definition of Death 
But how do we determine whether a person is dead or not? Before 
the dawn of the technological age, the answer to the question was relatively 
simple - irreversible failure of cardiopulmonary function. Since the 
advent of the technological age, a new way to define death has come into 
practice. The new definition relies on brain-related criteria determined to 
be irreversible and is commonly known as "brain death." 
How did we arrive at this new definition of death? Two entities came 
into play around the same time: technological advances such as ventilators, 
dialysis machines and powerful medicines were introduced that have the 
ability to save and/or extend lives and meanwhile discovery of successful 
organ transplant techniques were taking place. With the new technology, 
comatose patients were able to survive for extended periods of time. "The 
advent of transplantation surgery provided a strong clinical motivation to 
define death as loss of brain function since the success of it depends on the 
use of viable organs uncompromised by circulatory failure."3 A review of 
the literature clearly shows that organ donation and the diagnosis of "brain 
death" are so closely intertwined that it becomes difficult to discuss one 
without the other. 
Before the arrival of the diagnosis of "brain death," the first attempts 
at transplanting vital organs were not very successful because organs could 
only be taken from people whose hearts had stopped. Vital organs 
deteriorate quickly without blood circulation so the success of the transplant 
is related to the freshness of the organ. According to Porzio, "It is safe to 
say that the transformation in the approach within the medical profession 
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(to a new definition of death) has been triggered and propelled by organ 
transplants."4 
Eminent authorities began to question whether declaring death using 
neurological criteria might not be in order. In 1968 an ad hoc Committee of 
the Harvard Medical School met to discuss the issue. Their seminal report, 
"A Definition of Irreversible Coma" proposed defining irreversible coma 
as a new definition of death. The Committee drafted a set of criteria that 
physicians could use to establish a diagnosis of death. Included in the 
recommended testing was an EEG showing a flat-line result (to be repeated 
at least 24 hours later). Absence of brain stem and spinal reflexes were to 
be noted. This set of criteria came to be known as the "Harvard Criteria." 
When the Committee's report was published in lAMA, two revealing 
reasons for the proposal of this new definition were cited: (I) improved 
methods of resuscitation and support of individuals whose brains were 
damaged irreversibly, permitted their hearts to continue beating, at great 
emotional and financial cost, and (2) it was difficult to obtain organs for 
transplant using the traditional definition of death." (emphasis added) The 
Harvard Committee further suggested that since "the courts had always 
accepted the definition of death adopted by the medical profession as valid 
for all legal purposes, legislation to redefine death was unnecessary as long 
as the medical community agreed upon brain-death criteria."5 Since 
diagnosing "irreversible loss of brain function" in a person whose heart 
continues to beat is not a fact but a decision, the question of who is to 
decide was decided. As the old saying goes, you're dead when the doctor 
says you're dead. 
People in the transplant field were obviously pleased to know of a 
new way to diagnose death. Thomas Starzle, M.D., who performed the first 
human liver transplant, had described the difficulties of transplanting a 
vital organ as quickly as possible after death diagnosed by 
cardiopulmonary standards remarked, "Acceptance of brain death in 1968 
was a boon to transplantation."6 
A new method of diagnosing death was a radical idea. Was brain 
death readily "accepted" in the beginning? Medical, legal, and 
philosophical journals were rife with discussions regarding the ethical, 
legal, and social aspects of the idea. Questions were posed, such as: What 
is death? How do you know when a person is really dead? Is there dead-
dead and brain-dead? Is the determining fact of death to be clinical, 
biological, or legal? Slowly it became evident that "brain death" was the 
wave of the future, resistance quieted somewhat, and in some circles the 
principles became so universally accepted that they began to be taken for 
granted. 
The Harvard Criteria appeared in 1968 with many other sets of criteria 
following, some less restrictive than others, some requiring an EEG, some 
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not. As early as 1978 more than thirty sets of criteria could be found7 and a 
physician or institution was free to choose the criteria that best fit their 
needs. 
State statutes were being enacted to recognize this new definition of 
death but they varied so from state to state that considerable confusion 
arose. A group of Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death, 
facilitated by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, convened in an 
attempt to bring about some unity to the inconsistencies abounding in 
"brain death" statutes. The Medical Consultants proposed a model statute, 
the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) , and issued it to the 
President 's Commission in 1981. The UDDA stated that "an individual 
who sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory 
functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made 
in accordance with accepted medical standards."8 Their report included a 
set of criteria for determination of death and the brain-based criteria 
became known as the "whole brain standard." 
Dissent Begins 
A small hole in the dike relating to the acceptance of "brain-related" 
criteria of death appeared in 1979 when Byrne et al. essentially referred to 
it as a kind of "legal fiction ."9 But "brain death" had become the prevailing 
belief in professional circles and Byrne et aI.s' point of view was summarily 
dismissed; it did not fit into the intellectual climate of the time. As D. Alan 
Shewmon, M.D., put it, "no self-respecting academic neurologist would 
dare to entertain, let alone openly express, any objection to equating 'brain 
death ' with death. In fact, dissenters were typically dismissed 
condescendingly as simpletons, religious zealots, or pro-life fanatics ." 'o 
In spite of enormous effort, the hoped-for establishment of one 
uniformly recognized set of criteria to determine the irreversible cessation 
of all functions of the brain seems to be an elusive goal. Theoretically, and 
in practice, one doctor could diagnose a patient as "brain dead" following 
one set of guidelines, and another doctor examining the same patient using 
a different set of guidelines might come to a different conclusion. These 
inconsistencies are troubling, especially considering the close alliance 
between brain death and organ donation. If the patient were a prospective 
organ donor, could that fact sway the diagnosis? 
It's been over thirty years since the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee 
proposed the first set of criteria. Despite the advent of many new and 
improved sets, the American Academy of Neurology (AAN) acknowledged 
yet another "need for standardization of the neurologic examination criteria 
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for the clinical diagnosis of brain death" in 1995 and issued their own set of 
criteria. Relentless change in trying to standardize practice parameters for 
the diagnosis of brain death serves to further highlight the confusion and 
inconsistency surrounding the concept of "brain death." 
It's important to keep in mind that there are conditions that can 
interfere with the clinical diagnosis of "brain death" that a physician must 
be aware of and rule out no matter which set of criteria he chooses to use. 
These conditions include "A) Severe facial trauma, B) Preexisting papillary 
abnormalities, C) Toxic levels of any sedative drugs, arninoglycosides, 
tricyclic antidepressants, anticholinergics, antiepilieptic drugs, chemo-
therapeutic agents, or neuromuscular blocking agents, D) Sleep apnea or 
severe pulmonary disease resulting in chronic retention of CO2.'' 11 Even so, 
it has been acknowledged by several experts in the field that it can be 
extremely difficult to determine whether some of the conditions or drugs 
are present or not. 
More leaks in the dike began to appear when the concept of the 
"whole brain standard" came under attack. A spate of articles began to 
appear in journals of philosophy and medical ethics in the 1990s arguing 
for and against the concept. Rather than the controversy over brain death 
settling down, it appeared to be heating up. Some argued that irreversible 
cessation of all higher brain functions would be sufficient to diagnose 
death because the human being as a person is dead. Robert Veatch, one of 
the more prominent proponents of this belief, stated in a 1993 article in The 
Hasting Center Report that the whole brain definition of death was 
collapsing and a new definition was called for. Peter Singer asserts that the 
medical concept of "brain death" was more or less a fabrication 
unsupported by medical facts , as Byrne et al. had alleged earlier. He, too, 
favors cessation of higher brain function as adequate for determining the 
diagnosis of "brain death." 12 Acceptance of higher brain function cessation 
as a satisfactory brain death definition opens the door for enormous ethical 
discussions since those in persistent vegetative states (PVS) and 
anencephalic infants could be considered as "brain dead" for organ 
donation purposes. However, it is impossible to address that debate here, as 
it is material enough for a separate paper. 
The confusion regarding acceptable medical standards for diagnosing 
"brain death" came to light when Young et al. did a cross-sectional survey 
among a sample of 195 physicians and nurses likely to be involved in organ 
procurement for transplantation. The professionals were interviewed 
regarding their knowledge, personal concepts, and attitudes concerning 
"brain death" and organ donation. Only 35% were able to identify the legal 
and medical criteria for determining death. Their own personal concept of 
death varied widely from person to person. Most ofthem (58%) did not use 
a coherent concept of death consistently; and 19% had a concept of death 
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that could be said to be logically consi stent with changing the whole brain 
standard to classify anencephalics and patients in PVS as dead. The 
authors believe "the findings demonstrate confusion about correct criteria 
for determining death and differences in concepts of death that might prove 
troublesome to the transplantation enterprise." 13 Potential organ donors are 
usually victims of accident-caused trauma, sudden acute illness, or self-
inflicted injury.14 This means that a potential donor might be young and 
healthy-looking, which only adds to the uneasi ness and discomfort that 
medical staff might experience when death is diagnosed using brain-based 
criteria. 
If irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including 
the brain stem is necessary to diagnose death , why are auto-regulatory 
functions of the brain stem, such as cardiac rate, blood pressure, regulation 
of body temperature, blood sugar balance, endocrine function and salt and 
water balance ignored?IS A dramatic example of this is related by heart 
surgeon Walter Weaver, who has performed a number of heart transplants. 
He had no reservations about believing he was performing a good for 
society, surely most medical personnel involved in transplantation feel that 
way. But one time he was evaluating a young motorcycle crash victim as a 
potential donor when something inside him changed. The teenager was on 
a ventilator, he had warm, healthy looking skin, self-controlled temperature, a 
sustained blood pressure, and he was producing urine naturally. "How 
could I say that this young man was dead?" asked Weaver. Shortly 
thereafter he stopped doing transplants.16 Shewmon also found it disturbing 
that "some of the early cardiac transplant surgeons had at best ambivalent 
feelings about the vitality of the patients whose beating hearts they were 
cutting out, and at worst a belief that they were actually killing the donors 
but that this was justified by the saving of other lives."1 7 
A study carried out at Johns Hopkins University on ten "brain dead" 
donor patients who were operated on without anesthetic showed that ten of 
the ten had a dramatic rise in blood pressure and heart rate as soon as the 
scalpel began to cut in for organ removal , symptoms also found in live 
patients undergoing surgery who are given inadequate anesthesia. 18 
Anesthesiologist W. Andre Kofke says it may appear to the uninitiated that 
anesthetics are unnecessary during organ procurement since donors without 
cortical function cannot perceive pain from surgical stimulation. But, he 
acknowledges a sympathetic response to surgical stimulation such as 
tachycardia, hypertension, perspiration, and involuntary movement. This 
sympathetic response usually occurs within five minutes after the surgical 
incision, peaking within 5 to 20 minutes, but Kofke attributes this "mass 
reflex" to neurogenic vasoconstriction and stimulation of the adrenal 
medulla by the spinal reflex arc. Kofke says, " in addition, abdominal 
muscle tone may interfere with surgical exposure and involuntary 
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movement caused by spinal cord reflexes can be erroneously perceived as 
a sign of life." Neuromuscular blockers are given therefore to "obliterate 
the sympathetic response and involuntary movement and to provide 
satisfactory muscle relaxation."19 Kofke speaks of spinal cord reflexes 
being present, but the Harvard criteria said there should be assurance of an 
absence of spinal reflexes in order to diagnose brain death . 
Adding to the confusion, studies show that many patients (20% in 
one series) who fulfill the tests for brain death continue to show electrical 
activity on their electroencephalograms.2o As noted previously, an EEG is 
not a required test to diagnose brain death in many of the criteria. 
Dissent Increases 
In 1997, a flood started pouring through the dike 's enlarging holes. 
Two prominent experts, D. Alan Shewmon (a world renowned expert in 
"brain death") and Robert Truog (an anesthesiologist and Harvard Medical 
School ethicist) writing in two different journals in the same month of 
February denounced the diagnosis of "brain death" as false death. 
Shewmon says that "at present, there is no reliable clinical criterion to 
distinguish early in the course between a dead 'brain dead ' and live 'brain 
dead' patient - only in retrospect: some patients that rapidly and 
inexorable deteriorate despite intensive care may have been dead all along, 
and those that stabilize, at least for some days, should be presumed alive."21 
Robert Truog contends it may be time to abandon the concept of 
brain death, because it is incoherent in theory and confused in practice. 
Moreover, he says the only purpose served by the concept is to facilitate 
the procurement of transplantable organs. He acknowledges that the organ 
supply could be decreased if the concept of brain death is abandoned, so 
proposes alternative strategies to organ procurement. One startling scheme 
accentuates the contrived notion of brain death when he says we might 
consider changes in the law that would recognize instances of "justified 
killing" for the purpose of transplantation.22 
My primary ethical consideration at the outset was to be certain that 
death has taken place before retrieving an unpaired vital organ from the 
future donor. According to the UDDA, irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain including the brain stem equals death. The 
courts have accepted the UDDA brain-related criterion as a legally 
satisfactory definition of death, but is this definition adequate from a 
biological perspective? I believe the available body of evidence is 
sufficient to call into question the certainty of the diagnosis of brain death 
as true death from a biological perspective. In a large number of patients 
who fulfill requirements to be classified as "whole brain dead," doubt 
regarding the diagnosis is demonstrated by (1) Presence of auto-regulatory 
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functions of the brain stem, (2) Findings of electrical activity on EEGs, (3) 
Evidence of spinal reflexes. Though some involved in the transplant field 
seem to be able to ignore this fact, Truog thinks it significant when he says, 
"(T)he brain is physiologically defined as the central nervous system, and 
many clinically brain-dead patients retain central nervous system activity 
in the form of spinal reflexes ."23, (4) Some patients exhibit signs of 
consciousness despite the absence of a functioning brain stem according to 
Joseph Seifert. 24 When these phenomena are present, how can it be said 
that there has been cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including 
the brain stem? If there is evidence of brain function, no matter how 
minimal, the prudent and ethical decision must be to presume life. Given 
these uncertainties and the general confusion within the medical 
profession, how can we say the patient is truly dead according to brain-
related criteria? Removal of a vital unpaired organ from a person who 
cannot be declared dead with absolute certainty is a moral obstacle to that 
removal. It is morally unacceptable to perform an action that deliberately 
causes the death of that person, even if the good intended is to save the life 
of another human being. 
Pope John Paul II framed the dilemma well : " ". there is a real 
possibility that the life whose continuation is made unsustainable by the 
removal of a vital organ may be that of a living person, whereas the respect 
due to human life absolutely prohibits the direct and positive sacrifice of 
that life, even though it may be for the benefit of another human being who 
might be felt to be entitled to preference."25 
Addendum 
Though I believe it is morally unacceptable to remove a vital organ 
from a living person, I wouldn ' t want to close the door on vital organ 
transplantation. There are so many people desperately waiting for the new 
chance at life that an organ could give them. More study and deliberation is 
called for in the fields of medicine, theology, and philosophy (ethics) to see 
if a morally acceptable method can be found. 
Presently other avenues are being studied and attempted in the field 
of transplantation and I'd like to touch briefly on the issue of the non-heart 
beating donor (NHBD), though the topic deserves a separate paper. This is 
a controversial, complex process that isn' t exactly new, since a variation of 
the NHBD is the way transplants were originally done. It involves taking a 
patient (one who's on a ventilator, but a decision has already been made to 
discontinue it as being burdensome, extraordinary, or the like) into the 
surgery suite, and turning off the ventilator. (This is already being done 
with diagnosed "brain dead" patients.) Before organ retrieval surgery 
begins, the surgeon waits until the heart stops beating and the person is 
November, 2003 323 
then declared dead by cardiopulmonary criteria. The amount of time to 
wait after the heart stops before declaring death is controversial at this 
time. 
Also controversial is the question of whether or not to infuse patients 
with ice-cold organ preserving drugs before the heart stops because some 
contend those medications contribute to stopping of the heart, whereas 
others say they cause no harm. 
There is so much we don't know and we need to remain open to new 
ideas and possibilities, but each new one must be examined within a moral 
framework that respects the life and dignity of the donor. 
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